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II. JURISDICTION 
This appeal is from a Final Judgment by Judge Floyd H. 
Gowans of the Third Circuit Court, State of Utah, Salt Lake 
County, Salt Lake City Department entered on October 26, 1989, 
entitling plaintiff to judgment against the defendant Brown, 
Smith & Hanna for the amount of $4,033.25. This Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 3 of the Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals. 
III. NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
On or about November 10, 1989, the plaintiff 
Alphagraphics Commercial Printing Division (hereinafter 
"Alphagraphics"), brought suit against the defendant Charles C. 
Brown (hereinafter "Brown"), an attorney licensed to practice 
within the State of Utah, and against the defendant Brown, Smith 
& Hanna, P.C. (hereinafter "Brown, Smith & Hanna" or "BS&H") a 
Utah Professional Corporation, seeking to hold both jointly and 
severally liable in the amount of $4,216.24 for a printing job 
allegedly performed by Alphagraphics over a weekend for William 
Cooper Winery, Inc., a client of Brown. 
There was no contract, written agreement or invoice 
signed by either Brown or BS&H. The order itself was placed on 
Friday by the client, Guy Davis of William Cooper Winery, with 
Mr. Luebcke of Progressive Printing who in turned contacted the 
plaintiff Alphagraphics. Therefore, in seeking liability against 
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both Brown and BS&H, Alphagraphics relies solely upon an alleged 
statement that Charles would be responsible. This statement was 
claimed to have been made by Jeffrey Brown, a member of BS&H, at 
a meeting the following Monday after the printing was already 
completed. This meeting was scheduled with Jeffrey Brown at the 
request of Alphagraphics while Brown was out of town. Jeffrey 
Brown knew nothing of the printing and had not been made aware of 
the printing by Brown prior to his meeting with Alphagraphics. 
Furthermore, Brown, himself, knew nothing regarding the $4,000.00 
order placed by the client and had never dealt with Alphagraphics 
in this matter before. Alphagraphics knew this and intentionally 
set up the meeting with Jeffrey Brown at BS&H without contacting 
the client, William Cooper Winery. It was very important to 
Alphagraphics to get BS&H liable for the printing ordered by the 
client and Alphagraphics knew BS&H would not agree to be 
responsible for the client's $4,000.00 order. Therefore, 
Alphagraphics presented with this opportunity failed to receive a 
signed invoice, or any writting, contract, or even a statement 
indicating that BS&H would be responsible for the order. Rather, 
Alphagraphics relies on the alleged oral statement that Charles 
would be responsible. The defendants contend that Jeffrey Brown 
never made this statement at the Monday meeting and even if he 
did Alphagraphics does not have a claim against BS&H and any 
claim against Brown is barred as a matter of law. 
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IV. STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The issues presented on appeal are: 
(1) Whether the trial court erred by holding that 
there was an acceptance of a contract through 
ratification, after finding at trial that there 
was no ratification of the contract; 
(2) Whether the trial court erred in making its 
findings of fact in direct contradiction of the 
evidence and testimony of all parties; 
(3) Whether an oral statement by an employee of a 
corporation that an individual of that corporation 
would be responsible for a bill, which does not 
bind the individual named, can, as a matter of 
law, still bind the corporation to which that 
individual belongs; 
(4) Whether an oral statement by an employee that an 
individual will be responsible and not the 
corporation, can be found to be ratified by the 
corporation through that individual's acts 
although it is found not to be ratified by the 
individual named; 
(5) Whether a party's alleged failure to deny or admit 
responsibility for a bill or invoice, but promises 
to pass it on to his client, when there is no 
contract or legal liability for that bill 
constitutes acquiesence and ratification 
sufficient to create a binding contract; 
(6) Whether a corporation can be held liable, as a 
third party, based upon corporate ratification for 
a client's order who is not acting as an agent of 
the corporation. 
V. DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS STATUTES, ETC. 
Section 25-5-4, Utah Code Annotated is believed to be 
determinative in the above issues. It provides as follows: 
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(1) Certain Agreements Void Unless Written and 
Subscribed. In the following cases every 
agreement shall be void unless such agreement, or 
some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing 
subscribed by the party to be charged therewith: 
• • • 
(2) Every promise to answer for the debt, default 
or miscarriage of another. 
VI. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. This is an appeal by BS&H 
from a Final Judgment of the Third Circuit Court, State of Utah, 
Salt Lake City Department, Judge Floyd H. Gowans, which awarded 
plaintiff a judgment against BS&H in the amount of $4,033.25 
after dismissing the claims against Brown individually. 
B. Course of Proceedings. On or about November 10, 
1988, Alphagraphics filed a Complaint against Brown and BS&H, 
seeking to hold both defendants jointly and severally liable in 
the amount of $4,216.24 for a printing job allegedly provided by 
Alphagraphics for William Cooper Winery, Inc., a client of 
Charles C. Brown. Mysteriously, the client, William Cooper 
Winery, was not named as a party in the suit. 
Defendants answered the Complaint stating that they did 
not request any printing services from Alphagraphics and did not 
enter into any agreement with Alphagraphics to pay for the 
services allegedly performed by Alphagraphics on behalf of 
William Cooper Winery, Inc. Neither Brown nor BS&H agreed at any 
time to be bound by any order placed between Alphagraphics and 
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William Cooper Winery, Inc. There was no contract, writing, or 
invoice signed by Brown or by BS&H for the printing making Brown 
or BS&H liable. Defendants also raised the Statute of Frauds as 
well as the other equitable defenses of waiver, laches and 
estoppel. 
Defendants sought dismissal of the Complaint against 
Brown and BS&H on summary judgment, based upon the undisputed 
fact that there was no contract between the plaintiff and Brown 
or BS&H. Defendants also asserted that plaintiff's claim was 
barred by the Statute of Frauds, i.e., even accepting 
Alphagraphics1 contention as true Jeffrey Brown could not orally 
bind Brown to the order. Furthermore, the fact that no one 
stated that BS&H would be responsible for the order was 
undisputed. (Affidavit of J. Luebcke para. 6). 
The trial court denied defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment seeking to dismiss the complaint against BS&H even 
though there was no dispute that there was no statement or 
written contract entered into between Alphagraphics and BS&H (see 
Plaintiff's Response to Interrog. No. 7; Response to Interrog. 
No. 4, top of page 8). The trial court also failed to dismiss 
the complaint against Brown although the court stated that the 
plaintiff had not proven a case against Brown. 
The case went to trial without a jury on July 18, 1989 
and August 9, 1989. On the first day of trial, James Luebcke and 
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Kermit Johnson testified on behalf of Alphagraphics. Luebcke 
testified that he was initially contacted at Progressive Printing 
by Renae of BS&H regarding a quote for a client on a printing job 
for which he quoted approximately $500. (Trans. 19). Luebcke 
then met with the client Mr. Guy Davis, President of William 
Cooper Winery without Brown being present. (Trans. 21, 46 & 47). 
At this meeting substantial changes were made to the order by Mr. 
Davis of William Cooper Winery which substantially altered the 
order to a $4,000.00 project. (Trans. 21) Luebcke was given a 
delivery date and was instructed to proceed on the project with 
these changes by Mr. Davis of William Cooper Winery, Inc. 
(Trans. 23 & 46). Brown was not present when this meeting 
occurred and was never contacted regarding the changes. (Trans. 
47). Unbeknownst to Brown Progressive Printing was in Chapter 7 
and Luebcke was referring work over to Alphagraphics, where he 
was employed. (Trans. 18) Luebcke, without Brown's knowledge or 
consent contacted Mr. Kermit Johnson of Alphagraphics to see if 
he could perform the printing over the weekend. (Trans. 47 & 
48). The work was performed over the weekend and during this 
period of time Luebcke and Johnson did not know who was 
responsible for the printing. (Trans. 27). However, it was 
very, very important to Johnson to make sure that BS&H would be 
responsible rather than the client. (Trans. 61). Therefore, 
Johnson and Luebcke called BS&H the following Monday, in order to 
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set up a meeting with Jeffrey Brown at BS&H they did not contact 
the client and Brown was out of town. (Trans. 25, 26, 27 & 61). 
This was the first meeting between Alphagraphics and 
anyone at BS&H, no one at BS&H was aware of the $4,000.00 order 
that the client had placed. Although, Luebcke testified that 
during this meeting Jeffrey Brown stated that Charles would be 
responsible for the bill, (Trans. 30), both of the plaintiff's 
witnesses, Luebcke and Johnson, admitted that Jeffrey Brown never 
said that BS&H would be responsible for the bill. (Trans. 54). 
Furthermore, in accordance with the above undisputed testimony 
that BS&H was not to be the liable party, after the printing 
materials were completed they were delivered directly to the 
client Guy Davis of William Cooper Winery, Inc. (Trans. 54 & 
66). In fact, BS&H was not even contacted by Alphagraphics after 
the completion of the order. Rather an invoice was later sent to 
BS&H?s address but it was made to the attention of Guy Davis and 
Charles C. Brown. Phone calls were also allegedly made to 
various employees at BS&H regarding payment for the invoice but 
the court found no authority in these conversations to bind BS&H 
or to provide ratification by BS&H. (Trans. 38-42). Also one 
phone conversation did occur with Brown where he indicated that 
he would talk to the client and try to assist Alphagraphics in 
receiving payment. (Trans. 42-43). The plaintiff rested its 
case after the first day of trial. 
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At the end of plaintiff's case, the defendants again 
raised their Motion to Dismiss. The court found that there was 
no contract or meeting of the minds between Brown and the 
plaintiff, after the original $500.00 quote had turned into a 
substantially different $4,000.00 job. (Trans. 74-75). The 
Court also found no authority on the part of Jeffrey Brown to 
orally bind Brown to the order. (Trans. 76). The court 
accordingly dismissed the complaint as against Brown. The Court 
further stated that any conversations with Brown regarding the 
order was not a ratification of any alleged contract by BS&H but 
merely an attempt by Brown to act as a conduit to the client in 
assisting the plaintiff in getting paid. (Trans.78). The court 
held that there was insufficient evidence to find any 
ratification of a contract. (Trans. 78). Therefore, the 
remaining issue left for trial on plaintiff's case was whether or 
not there was a valid contract between Alphagraphics and BS&H. 
The Court did not dismiss the complaint as against 
BS&H, in spite of the fact that there was no contract, written 
agreement, or signed invoice by BS&H and the testimony of 
plaintiff's own witnesses was that no one stated that BS&H would 
be responsible. (Trans. 76). The court stated it could be 
implied that BS&H would be responsible for the bill if Jeffrey 
Brown stated at the Monday meeting that Charles Brown would be 
responsible, with the client Mr. Guy Davis being present and 
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agreeing to this. (Trans. 76) The court was obviously confused 
as to the facts in making this statement, as it was undisputed 
testimony was that the client Guy Davis was not contacted by the 
plaintiff and that neither Guy Davis nor Brown were present at 
the Monday meeting. (Trans. 25, 26 & 61). The court further 
incorrectly stated that the meeting was instigated by Jeffrey 
Brown of BS&H (Trans. 76) while the evidence was clearly to the 
contrary. It was Johnson and Luebcke who called Jeffrey Brown 
that morning to set up the meeting knowing that William Cooper 
Winery was not his client and that Jeffrey Brown knew nothing 
regarding the order or the arrangements for payment made by the 
client. (Trans. 61) In fact, as stated by the court Brown 
himself was only aware of the $500.00 bid. 
On the second day of trial, BS&H presented its case. 
Jeffrey Brown testified that he received a phone call on Monday 
morning, July 11, 1988, from Luebcke regarding a printing job for 
William Cooper Winery. Charles Brown, who represented William 
Cooper Winery, was out of town and could not be reached. (Trans. 
86). Therefore, Jeffrey Brown later met with Luebcke and two 
other gentlemen who asked some fairly trivial questions about the 
printing job. (Trans. 87). Toward the end of the meeting 
Jeffrey Brown was asked who should be contacted with further 
questions and they were told to contact Charles Brown, since the 
printing was for Charles' client. (Trans. 87-88). No one asked 
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Jeffrey Brown who would be responsible for the printing and 
Jeffrey Brown never stated that Charles would be responsible. 
(Trans. 89-90) No terms as far as time, quantity or price were 
discussed at the meeting because the plaintiff knew William 
Cooper Winery was not Jeffrey Brown's client and therefore this 
information was not known to Jeffrey Brown. In accord with the 
testimony of the plaintiff's own witnesses Jeffrey Brown 
testified that he never stated that BS&H would be responsible for 
the order. (Trans. 87-89). Furthermore, it was known to all 
parties that William Cooper Winery, was not a client of Jeffrey 
Brown and that Jeffrey Brown knew nothing of the financial 
arrangements for the printing, and therefore lacking that 
knowledge he would not have made arrangements for payment or 
indicate that Brown would be responsible for the order and 
contrary to the trial court's findings Guy Davis of William 
Cooper Winery, Inc. was not present at this meeting. (Trans. 25, 
26 & 61) 
After the close of evidence and argument, the court 
granted judgment against BS&H despite the undisputed facts. The 
court found that because Jeffrey Brown said Charles Brown would 
be responsible for the bill at this meeting with Guy Davis 
present, and because BS&H did not adequately deny responsibility 
for the invoice (Trans. 142-143) and did not properly inform 
Alphagraphics it was billing the wrong people (Trans. 144) BS&H 
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accepted a contract with Alphagraphics. Not the $500.00 contract 
but the $4,000,00 order requested by the client of which BS&H 
knew nothing about. The court erroneously found that Guy Davis 
was present at the meeting where questions as to the printing 
were discussed. (Trans. 143). The court further indicated that 
the phone conversation with Charles Brown wherein he allegedly 
stated that he would try to assist Alphagraphics in getting 
payment was an acceptance or ratification of the contract (Trans. 
143-144), after the court had previously held that such 
conversation was not an acceptance or ratification of a contract. 
(Trans. 78) 
Defendants timely filed objections to the vague and 
erroneous Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, which 
ambiguously state that Alphagraphics and BS&H entered into a 
contract either by defendants' direct statements, or by their 
actions, by their implications, and by their response after the 
merchandise was delivered. There was no specific finding as to 
what statements or actions constituted the contract. The 
merchandise was never delivered to BS&H nor was BS&H even 
notified of its completion and the finding of ratification is 
directly contrary to the court's previous ruling. 
The trial court denied Defendants' Objections. Final 
entry was made on October 26, 1989. On November 17, 1989, 
defendant BS&H filed its Notice of Appeal. 
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C. Disposition at Trial Court, The trial court 
denied the motions for summary judgment filed by both plaintiff 
and defendants. The trial court erred in failing to grant 
defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as the claims brought 
against Brown were barred as a matter of law. Furthermore it was 
undisputed that there was no writing, contract, or statement 
entered into making BS&H responsible for the order. The 
complaint against Brown and BS&H should have been dismissed on 
Summary Judgment. 
The case went to trial against both Brown and BS&H. 
Following plaintiff's case in chief, the defendants again raised 
their Motion to Dismiss against Brown and BS&H. This time the 
court granted defendants' Motion to Dismiss as against Brown, but 
still denied defendants' Motion to Dismiss as against BS&H. At 
the conclusion of trial, based upon erroneous facts and contrary 
to prior rulings and findings made by the court, the court 
granted judgment for plaintiff and against BS&H. BS&H objected, 
the court denied defendant's objections and entered judgment on 
October 26, 1989. 
D. Relevant Facts. 
1. On July 3, 1988, Renae of BS&H contacted Mr. 
Luebcke of Progressive Printing by phone to obtain a price for 
copying 20 pages of a 120-page prospectus. (Trans. 19). 
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2. The price quoted to Renae for the printing service 
was approximately five hundred dollars ($500.00). (Trans. 19). 
3. On Friday, July 8, 1988, Mr. Luebcke of Progressive 
Printing met with Guy Davis of William Cooper Winery in the 
reception area of Brown, Smith & Hanna. (Trans. 21). It was 
understood from the beginning that the work was to be done for 
Guy Davis of William Cooper Winery, Inc., a client of Charles 
Brown. (Trans. 46). 
4. At the July 8, 1988 meeting Mr. Davis of William 
Cooper Winery, Inc. unveiled a project totally different than 
that represented to Mr. Luebcke by Renae over the phone. (Trans. 
21). These changes were substantial and increased the project 
from a $500.00 order discussed over the phone to a $4,000.00 
project. (Trans. 27). 
5. At the time Mr. Luebcke discussed these changes 
with Mr. Davis of William Cooper Winery, Inc., Charles Brown was 
not present but was out of town. Charles Brown was never 
informed of these changes. (Trans. 47). 
6. At this meeting Mr. Luebcke was told to proceed on 
the $4,000.00 project by the client, Mr. Davis President of 
William Cooper Winery, Inc. (Trans. 23 & 46). 
7. Without the consent, authorization or knowledge of 
Charles Brown or anyone at BS&H, Mr. Luebcke contacted Mr. Kermit 
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Johnson of Alphagraphics over the weekend and placed an order 
with the plaintiff for the printing. (Trans. 47) 
8. It was Progressive Printing, not Charles Brown or 
BS&H that contacted the plaintiff Alphagraphics and placed the 
order with Alphagraphics for the printing. (Trans. 47; See also 
Plaintiff's Response to Interrog. No. 7 and documents attached, 
including Invoice No. 10527, with the Customer Confirmation 
Signature of Mr. Jim Luebcke; Affidavit of Jim Luebcke para. 4). 
9. Neither Mr. Luebcke from Progressive Printing nor 
anyone from Alphagraphics met with Charles Brown regarding the 
order. (Trans. 48). All the arrangements for the printing as to 
time, quantity and cost was arranged directly between Mr. Luebcke 
and the client Guy Davis of William Cooper Winery, Inc. (Trans. 
47). 
10. The majority of the work on the printing job was 
done by Alphagraphics over the weekend, without a writing or any 
agreement from Charles Brown or BS&H (Trans. 50) and prior to any 
meeting with Jeffrey Brown of BS&H. (Trans. 23). 
11. During the weekend, Mr. Luebcke of Progressive 
Printing and Mr. Johnson of Alphagraphics did not know who would 
be responsible for the printing bill. (Trans. 27) They 
proceeded with the order based upon faith. (Trans. 50). 
12. On the morning of July 11, 1988, Mr. Johnson of 
Alphagraphics wanted to know who was going to be responsible for 
14 
the order. (Trans. 27). Mr. Johnson made it very clear to Mr. 
Luebcke that it was very, very important for them to make sure 
the law firm was responsible and not the client. (Trans. 62). 
13. On the morning of July 11, 1988, after this 
conversation (Trans. 27), it was Mr. Johnson and Mr. Luebcke who 
called BS&H and set up an appointment to talk to Jeffrey Brown, 
while Charles Brown was unavailable (Trans. 87) stating that they 
wanted to go over some matters on the layout of the prospectus, 
knowing that William Cooper Winery was not Jeffrey Brown's 
client, a meeting was set up for 3:00 in the afternoon. (Trans. 
61). 
14. At this meeting, questions were asked and answered 
regarding the layout of the prospectus. (Trans. 87). Toward the 
end of the meeting it was asked if Jeffrey Brown should be 
contacted with any further questions to which Jeffrey Brown 
responded that they should contact Charles Brown since William 
Cooper Winery, Inc. was Charles' client. (Trans. 88). 
15. William Cooper Winery, Inc. was not the client of 
Jeffrey Brown and Jeffrey Brown did not say anything about who 
would be responsible for the printing. (Trans. 89). Jeffrey 
Brown had no idea who was responsible. (Trans. 91). There was no 
discussion at this meeting regarding the terms of a contract 
including time, quantity, price or terms of payment. (Trans. 
98). 
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16. Mr. Guy Davis of William Cooper Winery, Inc., who 
had directed Mr. Luebcke to proceed with the order, was not 
present at this meeting. (Trans 25, 26 & 61). 
17. It was represented to Jeffrey Brown at this 
meeting by one of the printers that Charles Brown said he would 
be responsible for the order. (Trans. 92). 
18. It is undisputed that Jeffrey Brown never said 
that BS&H would be responsible for the order. (Trans. 54). 
19. Upon completion of the job the material was 
delivered to the client Mr. Guy Davis of William Cooper Winery, 
Inc. (Trans. 54 & 66) BS&H was never notified concerning the 
completion of the job. (Trans. 57) 
20. An invoice was sent sometime in mid-July not from 
Progressive Printing but from Alphagraphics. (Trans. 33-34). It 
was not sent to the attention of BS&H but to Guy Davis and 
Charles C. Brown. 
VII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court's findings of fact are vague and do 
not include enough facts to disclose a logical and properly 
supported ultimate conclusion. 
2. The trial court's findings of fact are clearly 
erroneous and against the clear weight of the evidence. 
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3. It was inconsistent and arbitrary for the trial 
court to hold that there was no contract or ratification of a 
contract by BS&H in dismissing Brown after plaintiff's case in 
chief, and then later hold that there was a contract with BS&H 
based upon a ratification of the contract. 
4. The trial court abused its discretion in totally 
disregarding defendant's testimony. 
5. The evidence is insufficient to find a ratification 
of a contract between BS&H and Alphagraphics. 
6. Corporate ratification should not apply in this 
case, when the order and contract is between Alphagraphics and 
the client, William Cooper Winery, and there is admittedly no 
contract between Alphagraphics and an agent of BS&H for BS&H to 
ratify. 
VIII. ARGUMENT 
A. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE VAGUE; 
DO NOT INCLUDE ENOUGH FACTS TO SUPPORT A 
LOGICAL CONCLUSION; AND ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS 
AS AGAINST THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE 
Generally on appeal the appellate court gives deference 
to the trial court's findings of fact. However, the trial 
court's findings of fact must include enough facts to disclose 
the process through which the ultimate conclusion is reached 
indicating that the process is logical and properly supported by 
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the evidence; and not clearly erroneous. Hardy v. Hardy, 776 
P.2d 917 (Utah App. 1989). Under the "clearly erroneous" 
standard of review, the appellate court will set aside fact 
findings if they are against the clear weight of the evidence, or 
if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been made. Monroe, Inc. v. 
Sidwell, 770 P.2d 1022 (Utah App. 1989); Southern Title Guar. 
Co., Inc., v. Bethers, 761 P.2d 951 (Utah App. 1988). A finding 
of fact is clearly erroneous if it is without adequate 
evidentiary foundation or if it is induced by an erroneous view 
of the law. Cove View Excavation & Const. Co. v. Flynn, 758 P.2d 
474 (Utah App. 1988). An appellate court can set aside factual 
findings of the trial court if they are clearly erroneous. 
Backer v. Francis, 741 P.2d 548 (Utah App. 1987). 
The trial court's findings in this case are clearly 
erroneous as they are not supported by an adequate evidentiary 
foundation. The trial court made a finding of fact that BS&H 
entered into a contract with Alphagraphics by their actions, by 
their implications, and by their response after the merchandise 
was delivered. (Trans. 144). 
The court bases its finding on clearly erroneous facts. 
As to BS&Hfs actions and implications, the court states that the 
only time the parties ever met was the meeting with Jeffrey Brown 
on July 11, 1988, "with Guy Davis present." (Trans. 143). The 
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trial court further found that there is no question but that Mr. 
Davis was present in the Monday morning meeting and approved with 
Mr. Jeffrey Brown the nature of the work to be done. (Trans. 
75). The court reasoned, "that while Jeffrey Brown did not 
expressly say BS&H will be responsible, nevertheless, at his 
instigation, these individuals all met in his office. When the 
question is asked who will be responsible with the client 
present, Mr. Guy Davis being present, and no testimony of any 
response from him as to my company will be responsible or I will 
be responsible," under these circumstances the plaintiff would 
have reason to believe that the law firm and not the client would 
be responsible for the order. (Trans. 77). However, the 
evidence shows that Mr. Guy Davis of William Cooper Winery was 
not present at this meeting. (Trans 25, 26 & 61). Furthermore 
the meeting was not instigated at the request of Jeffrey Brown, 
but was instigated by the plaintiff, Mr. Johnson and Mr. Luebcke, 
who did not contact the client because they wanted to make sure 
that the law firm was liable on the order. There was no dispute 
at trial as to this evidence; therefore, the trial court's 
findings are against the clear weight of the evidence and should 
be set aside. Monroe, Inc. v. Sidwell, 770 P. 2d 1022 (Utah App. 
1989); Southern Title Guar, Co., Inc., v. Bethers, 761 P.2d 951 
(Utah App. 1988). 
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Furthermore, the court found that the parties may have 
entered into a contract through BS&H's actions after the 
merchandise was delivered. However, the uncontroverted testimony 
is that the merchandise was not delivered to BS&H nor was BS&H 
notified by the plaintiff upon completion of the printing. The 
merchandise was delivered directly to the client who had made all 
arrangements for the printing directly with the plaintiff. 
(Trans. 47). This finding is also directly contrary to the 
weight of the evidence and should be set aside. Monroe, Inc. v. 
Sidwell, 770 P.2d 1022 (Utah App. 1989); Southern Title Guar. 
Co., Inc., v. Bethers, 761 P.2d 951 (Utah App. 1988). BS&H 
received no benefit from the plaintiff's services. To allow the 
trial court's findings to stand on the evidence presented in this 
case would make a law firm liable for a client's debt's simply by 
referring the client to a local business. 
In viewing all of the evidence, it is insufficient to 
support the trial court's factual findings. Schindler v. 
Schindler, 776 P. 2d 84 (Utah App. 1989). These erroneous 
findings by the court had a direct effect on the court finding an 
acceptance or ratification of a contract by BS&H; therefore, the 
court's findings must be set aside and judgment overturned on 
appeal. Matter of Estate of Kesler, 702 P. 2d 86 (Utah 1985); 
Cerritos Trucking Co. v. Utah Venture No. 1, 645 P. 2d 608 (Utah 
1982). 
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B. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY HOLDING THAT 
THERE WAS AN ACCEPTANCE OF A CONTRACT 
THROUGH RATIFICATION AFTER PREVIOUSLY 
FINDING AT TRAIL THAT THERE WAS NO 
RATIFICATION OF THE CONTRACT 
In regard to the finding of ratification of a contract 
by BS&H, the court had previously found at the close of 
plaintiff's case, as follows: 
There has been some attempt by the plaintiff to show a 
ratification of this agreement by Mr. Charles Brown, 
and that stems from the conversation over the phone 
wherein he and Mr. Luebcke spoke, and Mr. Brown is 
reported to have said that the bill was larger than 
they had thought, that he had not received sufficient 
monies, but he would try. 
Now the plaintiff has indicated that—both in opening 
argument and in closing argument, that this had to do 
with a retainer. There was no testimony having to do 
with a retainer. The only testimony in the--or from a 
witness was that the bill was larger than they had 
anticipated, they had not received sufficient monies 
from the [client]. 
Now, that's a lot different from talking about a 
retainer, because this could very well now be simply an 
explanation that he's the conduit through which these 
monies are to travel, and there's no testimony that 
these monies were to be paid out of a retainer fee. 
And his further comment that he would try to get the 
money, I think adds weight to that, that he appreciates 
Alphagraphics' position and that he would try to get 
sufficient money from his client to pay the bill, and 
the court does not find that in any sense, is that 
ratification of the contract. (Trans. 77-78) 
The trial court found insufficient evidence at the end of 
plaintiff's case to find a ratification of a contract. 
Therefore, the remaining issue for trial on plaintiff's case was 
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whether t h e r e was a v a l i d c o n t r a c t e n t e r e d i n t o between 
Alphagraphics and BS&H. The defendant put on i t s case showing 
tha t there was no va l id contract entered in to between BS&H and 
Alphagraphics. However, the court granted judgment against BS&H 
based upon BS&H's a c t i o n s and i m p l i c a t i o n s , s t a t i n g t h e 
following: 
At no time does the law firm ever notify the plaintiff 
that you're billing the wrong people. We didn't agree 
to pay this bill, but rather, again, the only testimony 
we have is that Charles Brown will see if he can't get 
the money from the winery. At no time does he deny 
responsibility, at no time does he deny the existence 
of this debt, but simply continues on with this 
discussion by saying, well, we'll see if we can get 
some more money, we weren't given a big enough 
retainer, et cetera." (Trans. 144) 
The court found a ratification of the contract in 
direct contradiction to its earlier findings. (Trans. 144) The 
court previously had found no evidence of a retainer or that 
monies would come from a retainer. The billing was never sent to 
BS&H but to the attention of Guy Davis and Charles C. Brown 
individually. The court specifically found this action was not 
sufficient to be an acceptance or ratification of a contract. 
This change by the court greatly prejudiced BS&H and constitutes 
a clear error subject to reversal on appeal. Matter of Estate of 
Kesler, 702 P. 2d 86 (Utah 1985); Cerritos Trucking Co. v. Utah 
Venture No. 1, 645 P.2d 608 (Utah 1982). 
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c. 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO 
FIND A RATIFICATION OF A CONTRACT 
First of all, ratification is not available to the 
plaintiff in this case. A corporation may ratify and thereby 
render binding upon it the originally unauthorized acts and 
contracts of its officers or other agents. East Cent. Oklahoma 
Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Oklahoma Gas and Electric Co., 505 
P.2d 1324 (Okla. 1973). For the corporation to ratify a contract 
it must be entered into by an agent. The establishment of the 
agency is critical. Under agency law in Utah principals are 
bound by the acts of their agents which are within the apparent 
scope of their authority. The person entering into the contract 
must be an agent and must be acting pursuant to actual or 
apparent authority. Zions First National Bank v. Clark Clinic 
Corp., 762 P.2d 1090 (Utah 1988); Forsyth v. Pendleton, 617 P.2d 
358 (Utah 1980). It is undisputed that the contract or order, in 
this case, was placed by the client Guy Davis of William Cooper 
Winery and not BS&H. It is also admitted that Alphagraphics knew 
that the printing was for the client and not BS&H. The client 
was not an officer or agent of BS&H when placing the order nor 
was the client acting under any express or apparent authority. 
Therefore, there was no contract between an agent of BS&H and 
Alphagraphics for BS&H to ratify. Furthermore, BS&H merely made 
an inqury with Progressive Printing for a bid of $500.00 and any 
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ratification on the part of BS&H therefore would necessarily have 
to be limited to the $500.00 amount. 
Secondly, even if ratification does apply in this case, 
the trial court's prior ruling that the evidence was insufficient 
to find a ratification of the contract (Trans. 77-78) would be 
the correct ruling. It was at this point in time that the 
evidence presented by the plaintiff was fresh on the court's mind 
as nearly a month past before the court's subsequent ruling was 
made at the end of the second day of trial. 
The case relied upon by the plaintiff for ratification 
is City Electric v. Dean Evans Chrysler-Plymouth, 672 P.2d 89 
(Utah 1983), wherein the Utah Supreme Court states that where a 
corporate liability is sought for acts of its agent, liability is 
premised upon the corporation's knowledge of and acquiesence in 
the conduct of its agent which has led third parties to rely upon 
the agent's actions. Id. at 90. However, the Utah Supreme Court 
goes on to state that "Ratification is premised upon the 
knowledge of all material facts and upon an express or implied 
intention on the part of the principal to ratify." _Id. at 91, 
citing Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 P.2d 74 (1982). In City 
Electric, the Utah Supreme Court found insufficient knowledge for 
the corporation to ratify although two invoices had been paid. 
City Electric, supra, at 91. The Utah Supreme Court in Bradshaw 
v. McBride, supra, at 78, states that a ratification requires the 
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principal to have knowledge of all material facts and an intent 
to ratify. Unless there is a knowledge of all material facts of 
all the conduct in question, ratification of acts of corporate 
officers by the corporation cannot occur, American Timber & 
Trading Co. v. Niedermeyer, 558 P.2d 1211 (Or. 1976). 
In the testimony at trial it was undisputed that 
neither Brown nor Jeffrey Brown knew nothing regarding the 
$4,000.00 order or changes made by the client, Mr. Guy Davis of 
William Cooper Winery (Trans. 47) and there was no contract or 
meeting of the minds between Brown and Alphagraphics on the 
order. This was also the holding of the trial court at the end 
of plaintiff's case on defendants' Motion to Dismiss. (Trans. 74-
75) Therefore, there could be no .ratification of any alleged 
contract by Brown. Further, it is admitted by the plaintiff that 
the $4,000.00 order was placed directly by the client without the 
knowledge of anyone at BS&H, and contrary to the trial court's 
findings it is undisputed that the client was not present at the 
Monday morning meeting at BS&H. Therefore, no one at BS&H had 
the requisite knowledge to ratify a printing contract for 
$4,000.00. In addition, the fact that BS&H didn't have this 
knowledge was known to the plaintiff who wanted BS&H to be liable 
and chose not to notify the client to attend the meeting. This 
given the fact that the invoice was addressed to Guy Davis. 
Furthermore, at this meeting, Alphagraphics had the opportunity 
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but did not obtain a signature, written agreement, or a clear 
understanding that BS&H would be liable for the order; rather 
plaintiff merely alleges that an oral statement was made that 
Charles Brown would be responsible. This is not only is 
insufficient to bind BS&H, but lends credibility to the testimony 
of Jeffrey Brown, which the trial court totally ignored. 
Alphagraphics was in a position with far superior 
control of the facts than was Jeffrey Brown. In fact, it was 
Alphagraphics that intentionally set up the meeting with Jeffrey 
Brown after an inquiry from Progressive Printing had been made by 
a secretary of BS&H for the client. The order was then placed by 
Progressive Printing with Alphagraphics upon consultation by 
plaintiff with the client Guy Davis. This meeting and referral 
to Alphagraphics was unknown to Brown or Jeffrey Brown but known 
to the plaintiff. Furthermore, the work was done before the 
meeting with Jeffrey Brown and therefore, no reliance was ever 
placed by Alphagraphics on the Monday meeting. Based upon 
Alphagraphics superior knowledge of the facts, and the lack of 
knowledge of BS&H, this court should not and cannot hold BS&H 
liable for their client's order. 
Furthermore, for there to be a ratification of a 
contract by a corporation it is necessary for the corporation to 
receive the benefits as a direct result of the agent's 
unauthorized acts. Killinger v. IEST, 428 P. 2d 490 (Id. 1967); 
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Holmes v. McKay, 383 P.2d 655 (Okl. 1962). In the present case 
it is undisputed that the merchandise was ordered by the client 
and was delivered directly to the client upon its completion 
without any notice being given to BS&H. It was a third party 
that received the benefits of Alphagraphics1 service, not BS&H. 
Therefore, there can be no ratification by BS&H. Moreover, for 
there to be a ratification of a contract there must be reliance 
on the part of the party seeking ratification. City Electric v. 
Dean Evans Chrysler-Plymouth, 672 P.2d 89 (Utah 1983) In the 
present case, the meeting with BS&H and phone call with Brown 
occurred after the printing had been substantially completed. 
Alphagraphics therefore, could not have relied the acts of BS&H 
in printing the order and thus there can be no ratification. 
Plaintiff's argument of liability based upon 
ratification of a contract must therefore be based solely upon 
the fact that BS&H never informed Alphagraphics it was billing 
the wrong people. (Trans. 144). This is insufficient to ratify 
a contract. Ratification of a contract not only requires a 
knowledge of all the material facts, reliance, and a direct 
receipt of benefits, but it requires the corporation to recognize 
or act in acceptance or adoption of an unauthorized act. Bank of 
Santa Fe v. Honey Boy Haven, Inc., 746 P.2d 1116 (N.M. 1987). If 
BS&H had paid on the invoice or had received the printed 
materials for its own use, these acts may have risen to a 
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ratification. However, in this case, BS&H never accepted the 
bill and did not retain any benefits from the plaintiff. The 
printed materials were delivered to the client William Cooper 
Winery. When questioned about the bill which was sent to the 
attention of Guy Davis, Alphagraphics was told that it would be 
passed on to the client. There can be no ratification if the 
acts reasonably show an intention not to ratify. Phoenix Western 
Holding Corp. v. Gleesen, 500 P.2d 320 (Ariz.App 1972). In the 
present case, BS&H never paid on the invoice, but stated it would 
pass it onto the client. This does not show the requisite 
intention to ratify; it rather shows an intention not to ratify. 
Furthermore, lack of protest and mere passage of time alone does 
not constitute ratification. Burton v. Automatic Welding & 
Supply Corp., 513 P.2d 1122 (Alaska 1973); Atlas Building Supply 
Co. Inc. v. First Independent Bank of Vancouver, 550 P.2d 26 
(Wash.App 1976). 
Alphagraphics is seeking to hold BS&H liable for an 
order placed by a client without BS&H's knowledge or authority 
based upon ratification, when the undisputed facts clearly show 
that BS&H did not enter into a contract with Alphagraphics and is 
not otherwise liable. There is no basis in law or fact to find 
BS&H liable for the order and for this court to uphold the trial 
court's decision would be a great injustice. As a matter of law 
and policy, a corporation should not be bound through 
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ratification to contracts made by third parties simply because it 
is a law firm and fails to inform the party seeking collection 
that it is seeking payment from the wrong entity. Particularly, 
when it is admitted, as in the present case, that the corporation 
is not otherwise liable and the party seeking collection is aware 
of who the responsible party is but fails to seek payment from 
them. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
The trial court's findings of fact are vague and 
clearly erroneous and against the undisputed evidence. The 
doctrine of ratification should not apply in this case to bind 
BS&H to the contract of its client, a third party. The trial 
court was also in error in holding an acceptance or ratification 
of the contract after previously finding no ratification from the 
evidence. 
Furthermore, the evidence before the court is 
insufficient to find a valid contract between BS&H and 
Alphagraphics or the ratification of any alleged contract between 
Alphagraphics and jBS&H. 
Therefore, the trial court's findings of fact must be 
set aside and the judgment overturned. 
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